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Credit Bidding: Expanding the “For Cause” 





As auctions have become more prominent in Chapter 11 proceedings, 
credit bidding has bolstered the multi-decade trend of secured creditor 
dominance, which the Supreme Court sustained in 2012.  Since this 2012 
decision, bankruptcy courts have attempted to level the playing field by 
progressively expanding the interpretation of Section 363(k) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, which permits courts to limit secured creditors’ ability to 
credit bid “for cause.”  The conflict between the Supreme Court’s 2012 
decision and the bankruptcy courts’ recent interpretation of Section 363(k) 
created an uncertainty that currently plagues the market for secured claims 
of distressed companies.  This Note reviews the current state of the law 
surrounding credit bidding, examines the most recent developments likely 
to impact its future, and provides interpretive recommendations for 
bankruptcy practitioners and the judiciary. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Many modern Chapter 11 cases now center on realizing a sale of a 
substantial portion of the debtor’s business.  As a result, it is no surprise 
that secured creditors’ rights to credit bid in sales of their collateral under 
the Bankruptcy Code have become such important points of contention.  
Credit bidding involves a secured creditor bidding for its collateral in a 
bankruptcy auction using outstanding debt obligations as currency.  This 
Note reviews the current landscape of the law surrounding credit bidding, 
canvases the developments likely to be seen in the near future, and 
proposes a palatable interpretive solution for the judiciary. 
 
* J.D. Candidate, UC Hastings College of the Law; B.A., Government, Harvard University.  Thank 
you first to Jared Ellias for his inspiration and invaluable guidance throughout the writing process and 
beyond; to the Editorial Board of the Hastings Business Law Journal for their hard work; and to my  
friends and family for their unwavering support. 
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Although the Chapter 11 process is frequently referred to as a system 
of reorganization,1 many of the largest Chapter 11 cases in recent history 
cannot properly be labeled as such.  In fact, nearly fifty-six percent of these 
debtors engage in a sale of substantially all of those assets.2  Many of the 
largest bankruptcies of the twentieth century were of railroad companies 
whose largest assets were railroad tracks, which were too valuable 
collectively to be sold piecemeal and too expensive for any one buyer to 
purchase alone.3  Today, even in cases of extremely leveraged capital 
structures, funding resources such as lending syndicates enable arm’s 
length buyers to purchase entire firms. 
As a result of this paradigmatic shift toward asset sales, modern 
bankruptcy judges often serve as auctioneers in many high-stakes cases.  
This evolution of duties begs the question of how bankruptcy judges should 
structure the auctions over which they preside.  In deciding this matter, 
judges must keep in mind bankruptcy policy of maximizing recoveries to 
the debtor’s claimants.4 
From its enactment in 1978 until a circuit split began on September 
29, 2009, it was understood that the Bankruptcy Code absolutely protected 
secured creditors’ right to credit bid at a debtor’s sale of their collateral.  
Within this scheme, most bankruptcy sales took place under section 363(b) 
of the Bankruptcy Code, which dictates that a court can only deny secured 
creditors their right to credit bid under the seldom utilized section 363(k) 
“for cause” exception.5  In cases where the sale was to occur pursuant to 
the confirmation plan, section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) required courts to preserve 
secured creditors’ right to credit bid.  Until early 2014, the value associated 
with credit bidding was certain, as the bankruptcy courts rarely utilized 
section 363(k) and thus had little authority to limit the practice.6 
Then, in early 2014, Judge Kevin Gross decided In re Fisker 
Automotive Holdings, Inc.,7 in which he used section 363(k) to limit the 
right of secured creditors to credit bid in an auction of their collateral.  
 
         1.  See Nevin M. Gewertz, Comment, Act or Asset? Multiplicitous Indictments Under the 
Bankruptcy Fraud Statute, 18 USC § 152, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 909, 929 (2009).  
 2. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Reply, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 
673, 675–76 (2003) (finding that of Chapter 11 proceedings concluded in 2002, fifty-six percent of 
them  involved sales of assets). 
         3.   Id. at 699. 
 4. See Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 163 (1991) (affirming the “general Code policy of 
maximizing value of the bankruptcy estate”). 
 5. DONALD S. BERNSTEIN ET AL., The Logic and Limits of Credit Bidding by Secured Creditors 
Under the Bankruptcy Code, in LAWRENCE P. KING AND CHARLES SELIGSON WORKSHOP ON 
BANKRUPTCY AND BUSINESS REORGANIZATION 2011, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1975932. 
 6. See In re 222 Liberty Ass’n., 108 B.R. 971, 978 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990) (noting that the 
Bankruptcy Code contemplates that the creditor is protected up to the full amount of its claim through 
its right to credit bid at the sale of the property). 
 7. See In re Fisker Auto. Holdings, Inc., 510 B.R. 55 (Bankr. D. Del.  2014). 
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Later in 2014, In re Free Lance-Star Publishing Company8 was decided, 
which utilized the same “for cause” provision as Fisker to limit a secured 
creditor’s right to credit bid in a similar auction of its collateral.9  These 
decisions ignited the restructuring community, with some observers 
arguing that Fisker and Free Lance-Star redefined the “for cause” standard 
under which the right to credit bid may be constrained.10  Supporters of this 
position assert that the secured creditors’ conduct in Fisker and Free 
Lance-Star, which was deemed improper by the courts, was not uncommon 
practice for creditors in similar contexts.  In contrast, those arguing for 
restrictions on credit bidding cite secured creditors’ unfair advantage over 
cash bidders, which chills bidding procedures, constrains the price 
attainable by the debtor, and reduces the value of the estate.  Still others 
argue that the facts of Fisker and Free Lance-Star were unusually offensive 
and these bankruptcy judges simply applied a long-established rule to 
unfavorable facts.11  Considering the large amount of recent activity in the 
credit bidding arena, some observers contend that the Supreme Court will 
soon grant certiorari in another credit bidding case.12 
To help explain the controversy surrounding these decisions and to 
provide direction as to the future use of the section 363(k) “for cause” 
exception, this Note first explores security interests and their role in 
bankruptcy.  Then, it reviews relevant case law and examines the Fisker, 
Free Lance-Star, RML, and Charles Street decisions.  Finally, it analyzes 
the arguments surrounding the section 363(k) “for cause” exception and 
proposes a reasoned interpretation. 
 
II.  OVERVIEW OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN BANKRUPTCY 
 
Security interests are the backbone of many corporate loan 
transactions.  They allow a creditor to extend credit to a debtor while 
protecting his investment.  Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(“UCC”) governs security interests in personal property, while statutory 
law and case law govern security interests in real property.  Under Article 
9, a security interest is “an interest in personal property or fixtures, which 
secures payment or performance of an obligation.”13  To install a security 
 
 8. In re Free Lance-Star Publishing Co., 512 B.R. 798, 804-05 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2014). 
 9. Id. at 801. 
 10. David Griffiths, Bankruptcy and Restructuring Annual Review, WEIL BANKR. BLOG (Dec. 22, 
2014, 10:00 AM), http://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com/case-overviews/2014-bankruptcy-and-
restructuring-annual-review-2/print/. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. U.C.C. § 1-201(35) (2015). 
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interest in real property, a slight majority of states utilize a deed of trust 
while the rest utilize the mortgage. 
Under Article 9 of the UCC, creditors may attempt to enforce their 
security interests after default using three primary methods: (i) collection 
and enforcement of the debt through a judicial process,14 (ii) repossession 
and sale of the collateral without intervention of a court,15 and (iii) 
acceptance of the collateral as full or partial satisfaction of the debt.16  Each 
of these methods provides the creditor with a means by which to obtain 
possession of the collateral. 
In a typical securitized loan transaction, the debtor will grant the 
creditor a security interest in one or more assets through a security 
agreement.  This agreement effectuates the debtor’s ownership interest in 
the collateral in exchange for the security holder’s obligation to pay the 
agreed upon value to the debtor. 
Security interests are primarily used in loan transactions to secure the 
payment of a debt.  They provide the secured creditor with certain 
preferential rights in any disposition of collateral by the debtor.17  These 
rights vary among different secured interests, but most often if the debtor 
defaults on a payment, the secured creditor is vested with a right to seize 
and liquidate the property in order to receive the proceeds of the parties’ 
agreement.  Secured creditors’ ability to collect proceeds from the sale of 
their collateral in order to fulfill an outstanding obligation underpins the 
rationale of credit bidding. 
A security interest, once attached, is immediately enforceable against 
the collateral.  Attachment of personal property requires three things: (i) 
that the debtor have rights in the collateral or the power to convey such 
rights; (ii) that value be given; and, (iii) in most cases, that the debtor have 
agreed to a security agreement that sufficiently describes the collateral.18  
The statutory law and case law of individual jurisdictions govern 
 
 14. U.C.C. § 9-601 (2015)  (“After default, a secured party . . . may reduce a claim to judgment, 
foreclose, or otherwise enforce the claim, security interest, or agricultural lien by any available judicial 
procedure.”). 
 15. U.C.C. § 9-609(a), (b) (2015) (“After default, a secured party . . . may take possession of the 
collateral” either “pursuant to judicial process . . . [or] without judicial process, if it proceeds without 
breach of the peace.”); U.C.C. § 9-610(a) (2015) (“After default, a secured party may sell, lease, 
license, or otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral in its present condition or following any 
commercially reasonable preparation or processing.”); U.C.C. § 9-610(b) (2015) (“Every aspect of a 
disposition of collateral, including the method, manner, time, place, and other terms, must be 
commercially reasonable.”). 
 16. U.C.C. § 9-620 (2015) (providing that if the debtor consents and other conditions are met, “a 
secured party may accept collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the obligation it secures”). 
 17. U.C.C. § 9-315(a) (2015). 
 18. See U.C.C. § 9-203 (2015). 
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attachment of real property.  However, attachment alone does not ensure 
that the secured party’s interest will trump that of other lienholders. 
Creditors take security interests in collateral to enforce their rights in 
that collateral in the event the debtor defaults on their obligation.  A 
security interest enables the creditor to take possession of the collateral to 
satisfy the underlying obligation.  This enables the creditor to liquidate the 
collateral or repurpose it in a profitable manner.  If the proceeds from a sale 
of the collateral exceed the amount of the underlying obligation, the debtor 
is entitled to the excess.  However, if the proceeds do not satisfy the entire 
obligation, the creditor receives an unsecured deficiency judgment on 
which he may act in bankruptcy proceedings.  In this way, security interests 
protect creditors from downside in lending. 
Proponents of security interests argue that they lower the risk for the 
lender and the lender in turn passes those savings on to the borrower, 
thereby lowering its cost of capital.  Detractors contend that secured 
creditors can hold up reorganization of companies in financial distress.  
The creditors’ incentives, they argue, often are to foreclose early on the 
collateral, repossessing key assets and forcing the company into 
bankruptcy.19 
The most cited criticism of secured lending, however, is that if 
secured creditors are permitted to foreclose on key company assets, the 
debtor loses the ability to sell the business as a going concern and may be 
forced to liquidate the business for a lesser price.  This is inconsistent with 
the overarching bankruptcy policy of maximizing the value of the estate.  
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code resolves this potential for hold up by 
restricting creditors’ rights to enforce their security interests. 
 
III.  CREDIT BIDDING: OVERVIEW, HISTORY, AND POLICY 
 
A.  CREDIT BIDDING OVERVIEW 
 
True to its name, credit bidding involves a secured creditor bidding for 
its collateral in a bankruptcy auction.  In this situation, the debtor owes the 
creditor a specified sum of money under an obligation and the creditor 
seeks to extinguish that debt by bidding on its collateral.20  Normally, 
secured creditors are not entitled to recover more in bankruptcy than the 
amount of their allowed claim.  So, by making a credit bid, a secured 
 
       19. SING. INSOLVENCY LAW REVIEW COMMITTEE, FINAL REPORT (2013),  https://www.mlaw.gov.s 
g/content/dam/minlaw/corp/News/Revised%20Report%20of%20the%20Insolvency%20Law%20Reviw 
%20Committee.pdf. 
 20. Vincent S. J. Buccola & Ashley C. Keller, Credit Bidding and the Design of Bankruptcy 
Auctions, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99, 102 (2010). 
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creditor can protect himself “in situations where [his] collateral is proposed 
to be sold at a price that the secured creditor believes to be inadequate or 
below market, whether because of the expedited timing of the sale, an 
inadequate marketing process, or other factors.”21  For example, suppose 
that Company B, a creditor of Company A, holds a security interest in 
substantially all of Company A’s assets.  Suppose further that Company 
B’s outstanding obligation totals $5 million and that Company B expects its 
collateral to sell for $3 million in a bankruptcy auction.  If Company B 
values the collateral at $4.5 million, it can credit bid up to $5 million in a 
bankruptcy auction in order to protect itself from a depressed sale price of 
its collateral. 
Most often, the secured creditor is permitted to credit bid up to the full 
amount of his secured claim as consideration for the debtor’s obligation.  
This process allows secured creditors to compete with cash bids from third 
parties.  If no other adequate offers are made, secured creditors receive 
possession of their collateral in lieu of the proceeds of a sale.22 
 
B.  POLICIES BEHIND CREDIT BIDDING 
 
Credit bidding is a favored tool for maximizing the value of a 
bankruptcy estate for three primary reasons.  First, credit bidding increases 
the frequently small pool of bidders that are familiar enough with the 
debtor’s assets to purchase them on a condensed timetable.23  Financial, 
business, and legal due diligence require considerable effort and monetary 
expenditure that third parties often decide is insurmountable in light of the 
potential credit bid.  Secured creditors’ familiarity with the debtor’s assets 
preempts the need for such extensive due diligence, enabling them to 
participate in the auction on a condensed timetable. 
Second, credit bidding reduces debtors’ incentives to favor “white 
knight”24 buyers who may not pay the highest price for the assets.25  White 
knights may, for example, promise to use the debtor’s assets for the benefit 
of the debtor’s own management at the cost of the shareholders.26  This 
situation gives rise to a typical agency problem: shareholders want to use 
the assets in a manner that yields the highest value whereas the debtor’s 
management want to ensure their personal compensation and longevity.  
 
 21. See Beal Bank, S.S.B. v. Waters Edge Ltd. Partnership, 248 B.R. 668, 679 (D. Mass. 2000) 
(quoting 7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1129.05[2][b], at 1129–34 (15th ed. rev. 1998)). 
 22. See U.C.C. § 9-601 (2015). 
 23. Buccola & Keller, supra note 20, at 100. 
 24. “White Knight” buyers are those that acquire a company, typically in financial distress or 
undergoing a hostile takeover, on terms favorable to the company or its management. 
 25. Buccola & Keller, supra note 20, at 100. 
 26. Id. at 106. 
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Sales within bankruptcy pose an especially difficult conundrum because the 
liquidation of assets, which may maximize the value of the debtor’s estate, 
necessarily spells out unemployment for the management.27  Credit bidding 
solves this problem by enabling secured creditors to compete with white 
knights’ cash bids, thus bringing more competitive bids to the auction and 
reducing the debtor’s incentive to favor white knight bidders. 
Third, credit bidding avoids unnecessary transaction costs associated 
with preparing and financing a cash bid.28  It also eliminates liquidity 
constraints that might otherwise prevent the secured creditor from bidding 
and inhibit him from establishing an upset price.29  In theory, a secured 
creditor should be able to purchase its collateral entirely with a credit bid if 
it values the collateral at the same amount or less than the secured claim.  
This is logically sound because the creditor’s security interest in the 
debtor’s collateral assures either that the debtor will pay the full amount of 
its obligation or the creditor may foreclose on the collateral and retain the 
proceeds of a sale up to the full amount of his claim.30 
The benefits of credit bidding extend beyond protecting secured 
creditors to providing value to the debtor’s estate.  Bankruptcy policy seeks 
to maximize the value of the collateral so as to reduce the deficiency claims 
against the estate and ultimately maximize the value of the estate.  Credit 
bidding works to this end by enlarging the usually small pool of realistic 
bidders at the auction, which often leads to higher and more competitive 
bids, eliminating the debtor management’s incentive to favor white knight 
buyers who may not offer the highest and best price, and reducing 
transaction costs associated with submitting a bid. 
Although the Bankruptcy Code sometimes precludes creditors from 
exerting some of their property rights,31 it does not actually inhibit the 
creditors’ ownership of the property.32  Credit bidding can therefore be 
viewed as a rational acknowledgment of creditors’ property interests.  The 
ability to credit bid up to the face value of his claim in a bankruptcy sale 
ensures that a secured creditor will not “pay himself cash for his own 
property.”33 
 
 27. Buccola & Keller, supra note 20, at 106.  
 28. Id. at 100. 
 29. BERNSTEIN, supra note 5. 
 30. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 331 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
 31. For instance, the automatic stay prevents the creditor from repossessing his collateral.  See 11 
U.S.C. § 362 (2010). 
 32. See Bruce H. White & William L. Medford, A Secured Creditor’s Rights to Intellectual 
Property Licensed by a Debtor in Bankruptcy, 20-MAY AM. BANKR. INST. J. 24, 24 (May, 2001) 
(stating that a security interest is equal to a property interest and the termination of an automatic stay 
does not eradicate this property interest). 
 33. Buccola & Keller, supra note 20, at 102. 
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In practice, credit bidding allows secured creditors to bid the value of 
the debtor’s outstanding obligation plus any residual amount in cash.  
Proponents of credit bidding contend that “all of a debtor’s claimants, in all 
states of the world, should be indifferent among receiving their share of the 
sale proceeds from an outside bidder, from the creditor class as a whole, or 
from the credit bidding [creditor].”34  Credit bidding provides an 
opportunity for the secured creditor to realize what it believes to be the full 
value of the collateral it bargained for, insulates the secured creditor from 
being forced to cash out when the value of the debtor’s assets are 
depressed, and protects the secured creditor from the risk of “bankruptcy 
discount.”35 
However, arguments stand to suggest that credit bidding detracts from 
the goal of maximizing the value of the bankruptcy estate.  These critics, 
often junior creditors, argue that secured creditors’ ability to overbid with 
currency (the creditors’ deficiency claims) “chills” bidding by noncreditor 
third parties.36  The idea is that secured creditors’ bids deter third parties, 
who have to incur transaction costs conducting financial, business, and 
legal diligence and raising cash bids, from making competitive offers.  This 
is especially true if there is a question as to whether the assets are worth the 
face amount of the secured debt, which is frequently the case with 
distressed companies.  As a result, fewer potential buyers participate in the 
bankruptcy auction, often times yielding a lower purchase price and 
depressed estate values. 
Fundamentally, permitting secured creditors to credit bid does not 
harm the bankruptcy estate unless there is a viable bidder willing to pay 
more than the value of the secured claim and the credit bid somehow deters 
this higher bid.  A common way this occurs is by chilling the bidding and 
discouraging realistic buyers from participating in an auction.  For 
example, a prospective bidder may conduct a cursory valuation and decide 
that the assets are worth more than the potential credit bid, in which case he 
is left in a position of needing to bid more than the credit bid after fronting 
resources for due diligence, often all on a truncated timetable.  Thus, as a 
result of a secured creditor’s right to credit bid, a prospective bidder may 
realistically elect to not participate in the auction. 
 
 
 34. Buccola & Keller, supra note 20, at 104. 
 35. Academics argue that economic theory shows that debtors can suffer price discounts in 
bankruptcy sales due to prospective buyers’ fears of lacking undisclosed information about the financial 
condition of the seller.  See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. OF ECON. 488 (1970). 
 36. BERSTEIN, supra note 5, at 2. 
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C.  RECENT TRENDS IN CREDIT BIDDING 
 
Although secured creditors traditionally have taken credit bidding as a 
given right, recent case law puts that assumption in question.37  In the past, 
clever parties took advantage of their practically infallible credit bidding 
rights by acquiring secured claims, wielding a credit bid, and negotiating 
for a discounted asset sale or equity in the reorganized debtor. 
Two trends created this opportunity.38  First, a significant increase in 
second- and third-lien financing has created several echelons of secured 
debt on the balance sheet of many companies.39  For example, by one 
measure, the total value of second-lien loans increased from roughly $430 
million in 2002 to $17.6 billion in 2005.40  Second, a large magnitude of 
nontraditional lenders emerged in recent years.41  These lenders include 
private equity funds, hedge funds, and other distressed debt investment 
funds that have higher tolerances for debts of financially distressed 
companies.42  Significantly, these higher risk tolerances enable the lenders 
to engage in “loan to own” strategies wherein they enter into a loan 
agreement with an eye towards taking control of the borrower.43 
These trends have created an environment where investors are more 
likely to purchase the secured debt of financially distressed companies, 
strategically wield their credit bid, and eventually bid on their collateral in 
bankruptcy auctions.  Because Bankruptcy Code section 363(k) empowers 
the court to restrict a secured creditor’s ability to credit bid “for cause,” 
bankruptcy courts will likely continue to come up against challenges to 
credit bids. 
 
D.  CREDIT BIDDING UNDER PRE-CODE STATE LAW 
 
Although credit bidding is hotly contested within bankruptcy 
proceedings, the right to credit bid in foreclosure proceedings is well-
recognized under applicable nonbankruptcy law.44  Although much of the 
 
 37. See generally Fisker, 510 B.R. at 55. 
 38. See Daniel P. Winikka & Debra K. Simpson, Will Bankruptcy Courts Limit the Right to Credit 
Bid?, 17 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 6, Art. 6 (2008). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Rob Graver, The Benefits of Second Lien Loans, CAPITALEYES (BANK OF AMERICA), 
(Nov./Dec. 2006), available online at: http://corp.bankofamerica.com/public/public.portal?_pd_page_ 
label=products/abf/capeyes/archive_index&dcCapEyes=indCE&id=339. 
 41. Winikka & Simpson, supra note 38.  
 42. Id. 
 43. Id.  
 44. See, e.g., Broadmoor Realty, Inc. v. First Nationwide Bank, 568 So.2d 779, 781 (Ala. 1990) 
(“The underlying purpose of a foreclosure sale is to sell property at public outcry in order to generate 
funds to pay the affected creditors. . . .  To require [a] ‘cash bid’ here would be to elevate form over 
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pertinent case law does not directly touch on credit bidding, these cases 
generally presuppose that creditors possess the right to credit bid.45 
The most significant nonbankruptcy law case on the topic is Louisville 
Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford.46  Here, Justice Brandeis struck down 
section 75 of the First Frazier-Lemke Act, holding that it took “from the 
Bank [mortgagee] without compensation, and given to Radford, rights in 
specific property which are of substantial value . . . without just 
compensation,” which violated the Fifth Amendment.47  In his opinion, 
Justice Brandeis considered the foundation of secured creditors’ right to bid 
for their collateral in bankruptcy auctions.48  He explained how the 
conceptual understanding of a “mortgage” in U.S. law developed from a 
“conditional conveyance theory,” under which defaulting borrowers 
automatically forfeited their property to the creditor under strict 
foreclosure, to a “lien theory,” under which the mortgagor was entitled to 
the protection of a public sale.49 
Justice Brandeis concluded that a mortgagee’s right to bid at the 
trustee’s auction and subsequently seize the collateral amounted to an 
indispensable property right.50  The effect of this holding was to categorize 
the state law right of a secured creditor to bid at a foreclosure sale as a 
property right, which may entitle it to constitutional protection.51  The 
continued validity of this decision is the subject of some debate.52  
Although the Louisville Joint Stock opinion does not directly discuss credit 
bidding, the logic behind Justice Brandeis’ opinion — that in lieu of seizing 
the collateral the mortgagee has a property right to bid at a foreclosure sale 
— embraced a state law right to credit bid on par with the right to make a 
cash bid. 
Although the Bankruptcy Act did not include a provision specifically 
governing credit bidding, it did recognize secured creditors’ right to credit 
 
substance.”). 
 45. See e.g., Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell, 900 P.2d 601, 616 (Cal. 1995) (concluding that 
the secured creditor’s “full credit bid” did not preclude (as a matter of law) its fraud claims against 
certain defendants); Mogilka v. Jeka, 389 N.W.2d 359, 364 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that under a 
plain reading of the statute at issue, junior lienholders who purchase an asset at foreclosure may only 
credit their lien against the purchase price after senior lienholders have been paid in full). 
 46. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935). 
 47. Id. at 601–02. 
 48. Id. at 578–79. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 601–02. 
 51. Id. at 594. 
       52.  See James Steven Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors’ Rights in Reorganization: A 
Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REV. 
973 (1983). 
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bid.  This was primarily illustrated by a handful of court decisions under 
the Act assuming that secured creditors possessed the right to credit bid.53 
 
E.  CREDIT BIDDING UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 
 
1.  Section 363 Sales 
 
Debtors who wish to limit credit bidding in a sale of their assets may 
utilize one of two provisions of the Bankruptcy Code: section 363 and 
section 1129.  Recently, debtors have progressively elected to use section 
363 of the Code to carry out asset sales within Chapter 11.54 
Section 363(b) empowers a trustee, or more frequently a debtor-in-
possession, to “use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of 
business, property of the estate.”55  This provision permits the debtor to sell 
its assets free and clear of encumbrances.56  Typically, a debtor will file a 
Chapter 11 petition, avail itself of the Code provisions that can protect it, 
and then sell its assets through an auction under section 363. 
However, section 363 also ensures that the interests of secured 
creditors are preserved in “free and clear” sales.  For example, section 
363(e) affords secured creditors the right to adequate protection of their 
interest,57 which typically means that the secured creditors’ liens attach to 
the proceeds of the sale.  Secured creditors also invoke section 363(k),58 
which generally assures the right to credit bid, unless the court orders 
otherwise “for cause.”  When valuing collateral, courts predominantly 
favor holding public auctions and construe section 363 to permit secured 
creditors to credit bid the whole face value of their claims.59 
 
2.  Sales Pursuant to a Debtor’s Chapter 11 Plan 
 
In the past, debtors had a viable avenue to avoid credit bids through 
section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Code.  The requirements of section 363 did 
not necessarily apply to plans of reorganization under section 1129 and 
debtors would try to convince judges to approve their plans that prohibited 
 
 53. See, e.g., In re Renne, 55 F. Supp. 868, 871–72 (D. Neb. 1944); Hous. Inv. Corp. v. Todman, 
15 V.I. 300, 302 (V.I. Terr. Ct. 1978). 
 54. See e.g., Contrarian Funds LLC v. Aretex LLC (In re Westpoint Stevens, Inc.), 600 F.3d 231, 
236–37 (2d Cir. 2010); Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, LP (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 432 F.3d 
448, 453 (3d Cir. 2006); United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 211 v. Family Snacks, Inc. 
(In re Family Snacks, Inc.), 257 B.R. 884, 887 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001). 
 55. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2010). 
 56. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2010). 
 57. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (2010). 
 58. 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (2010). 
       59.  See, e.g., Cohen, 432 F.3d at 459.  
  
252 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 12:2 
credit bidding.60  However, the Supreme Court in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 
LLC v. Amalgamated Bank61 ended this practice. 
If a debtor seeks to conduct a sale pursuant to a Chapter 11 plan 
without the approval of secured creditors, the debtor must convince the 
court that the plan is “fair and equitable” in its treatment of dissenting 
classes.62  Section 1129(b)(2)(A) describes the three options debtors have 
when attempting to meet the “fair and equitable” test.  First, and most 
commonly utilized, whoever holds the secured claims may keep their liens 
on collateral in place and receive deferred payments equal to the present 
value of their collateral.63  Second, the debtor must sell the collateral free 
and clear of any liens, with the liens attaching to the proceeds of any sale.64  
Under this second scheme, the secured creditor must be permitted to credit 
bid.  Finally, the plan of reorganization must ensure that the secured 
creditors receive the “indubitable equivalent” of their secured claims.65  
This ambiguous term has generally come to mean the value that the secured 
creditor was contractually assured of receiving.  Proceedings typically 
become controversial when plan proponents attempt to “cramdown” a plan 
that includes an auction, but bans credit bidding.66 
 
3.  Restricting Credit Bidding “For Cause” Under Section 363(k) 
 
Despite the Code’s grant of entitlement, secured creditors’ right to 
credit bid is not absolute.  The Code acknowledges that secured creditors 
with liens on assets that the debtor is trying to sell may credit bid for such 
assets up to the value of the obligation “unless the court for cause orders 
otherwise.”67  This judicial power applies both to sales outside of a Chapter 
11 plan of reorganization and pursuant to a cramdown plan.  Section 363(k) 
of the Code provides: 
 
At a sale under subsection (b) of this section of property that is 
subject to a lien that secures an allowed claim, unless the court 
for cause orders otherwise the holder of such claim may bid at 
such sale, and, if the holder of such claim purchases such 
 
 60. Buccola & Keller, supra note 20, at 107.  
 61. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065 (2012). 
 62. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2010). 
 63. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) (2010). 
 64. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2010). 
 65. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2010). 
 66. Buccola & Keller, supra note 20, at 108.  
 67. 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (2010). 
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property, such holder may offset such claim against the purchase 
price of such property.68 
 
Junior creditors and competing bidders often utilize this provision to 
challenge the secured creditors’ right to credit bid.  Specifically, they argue 
that permitting the secured creditor to credit bid, especially on a protracted 
timeline, will discourage other prospective bidders from investing the 
resources necessary to conduct due diligence, thereby inhibiting the estate’s 
ability to garner the highest price for the assets.  Since RadLAX, these 
arguments have gained traction.69 
Courts’ use of the “for cause” exception is still rare, but it is possible 
that in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in RadLAX, the 
bankruptcy courts will increasingly construe this language expansively so 
as to prevent holders of secured debt from reducing the value of bankruptcy 
estates.  In the few recent cases where courts have restricted credit bidding 
“for cause,” the facts of the cases included at least one of a number of 
commonalities.  For example, courts limited credit bidding when there was 
bad faith by the secured creditor or collusion with the debtor or trustee,70 
when the secured creditor’s lien on the collateral was subject to a bona fide 
dispute regarding its validity or priority,71 and when severe injustice to 
other lienholders would have occurred.72 
Even in the limited cases where a moratorium on credit bidding may 
be appropriate, modern courts remain cautious of imposing blanket 
prohibitions and instead opt for protective conditions on the credit bid.73  
Still left unresolved is the issue of whether a party can establish cause 
under section 363(k) to restrict credit bidding based only on the potential 
injury it could have on the price gathered in the auction.  Parties have 
previously argued that credit bidding would chill the auction,74 but nobody 
 
 68. 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (2010) (emphasis added) 
 69. See Fisker, 510 B.R. at 57-60; Free-Lance Star, 512 B.R. at 805. 
 70. See, e.g., In re Aloha Airlines, Inc., No. 08-00337, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 4588, at 25–26 (Bankr. 
D. Haw. 2009) (holding that cause existed under section 363(k) where the creditor was contractually 
bound after the purchase of intellectual property to license it to a company that had allegedly 
contributed to the failure of the debtor’s business). 
 71. In re Akard Street Fuels, L.P., 2001 WL 1568332 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2001) (holding that “a 
bona fide dispute as to a creditor’s liens satisfies § 363(k)’s requirement of ‘for cause’ in disallowing a 
secured creditor to credit bid at a sale”). 
 72. See, e.g., In re Takeout Taxi Holdings, Inc., 307 B.R. 525, 536 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2004) 
(reasoning that cause may be found to deny a secured creditor the right to credit bid if there are other 
secured creditors with liens of equal priority, and there are no cash proceeds from the sale available for 
distribution to them). 
 73. See, e.g., In re Octagon Roofing, 123 B.R. 583, 588 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) (requiring the 
credit bidding bank to deliver an irrevocable letter of credit to the trustee to secure the portion of the bid 
based on a mortgage that was the subject of a pending adversary proceeding). 
 74. See In re Morgan House Gen. Pshp., 1997 WL 50419 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 1997). 
  
254 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 12:2 
has yet attempted using that argument alone to establish cause.  Although 
“for cause” is still a largely undefined concept and has previously been 
treated as a limited exception,75 it remains a strong weapon that debtors, 
junior creditors, and prospective buyers wield to constrain credit bidding. 
 
IV.  RECENT DECISIONS IN THE CREDIT BIDDING ARENA 
 
For many years, there were few, if any, noteworthy decisions that 
examined secured creditors’ right to credit bid.  Historically, credit bidding 
was considered non-controversial.  But, in 2009, a string of cases began 
that created a circuit split.  At issue in these cases was whether debtors in 
Chapter 11 proceedings could restrict a secured creditor’s right to credit bid 
in a cramdown.  Ultimately, the Supreme Court settled the issue in RadLAX 
Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank,76 in which it struck down 
debtors’ ability to pass cramdown plans restricting secured creditors’ right 
to credit bid. 
At the time, the implications of the following decisions sent 
shockwaves through the minds of bankruptcy practitioners and firms 
investing in financially distressed companies.77  Long considered an 
inviolable right upon which secured creditors relied, the ability to credit 
bidding suddenly came into question. 
 
A.  RECENT CASES APPLYING § 1129(B)(2) 
 
1.  In re Pacific Lumber Company 
 
In re Pacific Lumber was the first case to protect debtors’ ability to 
restrict secured creditors’ right to credit bid through the use of cramdown.  
Pacific Lumber concerned the two primary debtors in a group of six, 
Pacific Lumber Company (“Palco”) and Scotia Pacific LLC (“Scopac”).  
These two debtors grew, harvested, and processed timber under an 
exclusive contract.78  After a year of lackluster progress toward a plan of 
reorganization, the bankruptcy court terminated the debtors’ exclusivity 
period and permitted the filing of five competing plans of reorganization.  
The court only considered two of these plans for confirmation.  The first 
 
 75. See In re Theroux, 169 B.R. 498 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1994); In re Diebart Bancroft, 1993 WL 
21423 (E.D. La. 1993). 
 76. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 132 S. Ct. at 2073 (Justice Kennedy took no part in the decision). 
 77. Buccola & Keller, supra note 20, at 101. 
 78. In re Pacific Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229, 236 (5th Cir. 2009) (The appeal specifically 
concerned two of the debtors: Pacific Lumber Company (Palco) and Scotia Pacific LLC (Scopac)). 
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was proposed by the secured notes indenture trustee, which covered only 
Scopac.  The second plan was proposed by Marathon and MRC.79 
After examination, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of 
Texas approved the Marathon/MRC plan,80 but disapproved the indenture 
trustee’s plan.81  The Marathon/MRC plan dictated that the debtors’ assets, 
including the “Timberlands” and assets of the sawmill would be conveyed 
to two new entities, Townco and Newco.82 
In order for the court to confirm the Marathon/MRC plan over the 
dissent of the secured noteholders, the proponents needed to utilize the 
cramdown provision of section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Code.83  As part of the 
confirmation proceedings, the court heard testimony on the valuation of the 
debtors’ assets.  It concluded that the Timberlands were valued at “not 
more than $510 million”84 and, therefore, $510 million was the 
“indubitable equivalent”85 of the noteholders’ secured note claim.  This 
$510 million figure was far less than the value of the noteholders’ original 
claim, which totaled approximately $740 million.86  Primarily due to this 
disparity in valuation, the indenture trustee and several secured noteholders 
moved for a stay of confirmation of the plan pending appeal.87  The court 
denied their motion and the appeal was certified directly to the Fifth 
Circuit.88 
On appeal in front of a Fifth Circuit panel, the indenture trustee and 
secured noteholders argued that the Timberlands were sold without 
providing the secured noteholders an opportunity to credit bid and 
therefore, under section 1129(b)(1) of the Code, the plan was not “fair and 
equitable.”89  However, in a feat of statutory interpretation, the Fifth Circuit 
disagreed with the indenture trustee and secured noteholders.  Rather, the 
court reasoned that “[t]he non-exhaustive nature of the three subsections is 
inconsistent with treating them as compartmentalized alternatives.”90  In 
other words, section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) does not apply to the exclusion of 
sections 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) and (iii).  On the contrary, section 1129(b)(2)(A) 
should be read disjunctively and understood to guarantee secured creditors 
the right to credit bid only where subsection 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) is the only 
 
 79. Pacific Lumber Co., 584 F.3d at 237. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id.  
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. at 238.  
 84. Pacific Lumber Co., 584 F.3d at 238. 
 85. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(a)(iii) (2012). 
 86. Pacific Lumber, 584 F.3d at 237. 
 87. Id. at 239.  
 88. Id.  
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. at 245–46. 
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applicable provision of section 1129(b)(2)(A).  The court emphasized that, 
with respect to whether the plan furnished the secured noteholders with the 
“indubitable equivalent” of their claims, section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) 
referenced “such claims,” which meant that under section 506 of the Code, 
the noteholders’ “allowed secured claims” should be considered.91 
The secured noteholders continued to protest the claim, arguing that 
by denying them the right to credit bid and foreclose on the Timberlands, 
the plan “failed to afford them the indubitable equivalent because they 
forfeited the possibility of later increases in the collateral’s value.”92  In 
response, the Fifth Circuit underscored that the Bankruptcy Code “does not 
protect a secured creditor’s upside potential; it protects the ‘allowed 
secured claim.’”93  The court also indicated that the valuation process it 
conducted ensured that the plan, “insofar as it paid the noteholders the 
allowed amount of their secured claim, did not violate the absolute priority 
rule.”94  A mild surprise was that the court’s decision did not address the 
policy contradiction between section 1111(b) of the Code, which Congress 
designed to protect secured creditors against judicial undervaluation of 
their collateral, and the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that secured creditors’ 
“upside potential” is not protected by the Bankruptcy Code.95 
 
2.  In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC 
 
Soon after the Fifth Circuit’s decision in In re Pacific Lumber, the 
Third Circuit followed suit in In re Philadelphia Newspapers, affirming a 
district court ruling that approved bid procedures restricting secured 
creditors’ right to credit bid at an auction of the debtor’s assets.96  
However, this decision was not without criticism.  Judge Thomas L. Ambro 
wrote a notable dissent to the majority’s decision.97  His primary contention 
was that the majority’s decision would upset “three decades of secured 
creditors’ expectations, thus increasing the cost of credit.”98 
The plan proposed to the Bankruptcy Court in Philadelphia 
Newspapers provided that substantially all of the debtor’s assets would be 
sold at a public auction, free and clear of liens.99  The substantial proceeds 
 
 91. Pacific Lumber, 584 F.3d at246. 
 92. Id. at 247. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 249.  
       95.  See Jason S. Brookner, Pacific Lumber and Philadelphia Newspapers: The Eradication of a 
Carefully Constructed Statutory Regime Through Misinterpretation of Section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, 85 AM. BANKR. L.J. 127, 152 (2011). 
 96. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 301 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 97. Id. at 319. 
 98. Id. at 338. 
 99. Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 301. 
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of such sale would be used to pay expenses and be distributed to 
creditors.100  Importantly, the debtors structured the reorganization plan to 
block credit bidding by secured creditors.101  In addressing this issue, the 
bankruptcy court applied the canon of statutory construction of lex 
generalis, stating that specific laws prevail over general ones,102 to section 
1129(b)(2)(A).  The court reasoned that the disjunctive “or” phrasing of 
section 1129(b)(2)(A) “operates to provide alternatives.”103  This is 
consistent with the definition of “or” provided by the Bankruptcy Code, 
which states that “or” is not exclusive.104  In support of its proposition, the 
bankruptcy court cited In re Pacific Lumber for the proposition that 
“because the three subsections of § 1129(b)(2)(A) are joined by the 
disjunctive ‘or,’ they are alternatives.”105  Thus, the court reasoned, a 
debtor may avail itself to either subsection (i), (ii), or (iii) and is free from 
satisfying more than one subsection.106 
On appeal, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
reversed the decision of the bankruptcy court, holding that section 
1129(b)(2)(A) barred the lenders from credit bidding in the auction.107  In 
analyzing the issue, the district court took a much more textualist approach 
than the bankruptcy court.108  The district court looked to the Fifth Circuit’s 
In re Pacific Lumber109 decision and reasoned that since the debtor’s plan 
seemingly met the “indubitable equivalent” standard of section 
1129(b)(2)(A)(iii), the plan’s denial of credit bidding was permitted.110 
The Third Circuit predominantly agreed with the district court, 
concluding that it “simply cannot look past the statutory text, which plainly 
supports the conclusion that § 1129(b)(2)(A) does not require credit 
bidding in plan sales of collateral free of liens.” Like its peer, the Third 
Circuit availed its reasoning of the disjunctive nature of the word “or” in 
 
 100. Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d  at 301–02 (noting “[u]nder the Plan, the purchase will generate 
approximately $37 million in cash for the Lenders.  Additionally, the Lenders will receive the Debtors’ 
Philadelphia headquarters which the Debtors have valued at $ 29.5 million, subject to a two-year rent 
free lease for the entity that will operate the newspapers.  The Lenders would receive any cash that is 
generated by a higher bid at the public auction.”). 
 101. Id. at 302. 
 102. See Lex specialis-Principle, TRANS-LEX.ORG LAW RESEARCH, http://www.trans-lex.org/910 
000 (last visited Jan. 23, 2016). 
 103. Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3 at 305. 
 104. 11 U.S.C. § 102(5) (2012). 
     105.  Pacific Lumber, 584 F.3d at  245. 
 106. Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 305. 
 107. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 418 B.R. 548, 552 (E.D.Pa. 2009). 
 108. Id. at 566–67 (explaining “any alleged unscrupulous conduct engaged in the by the respective 
parties . . . is irrelevant to the Court’s analysis. Rather, the discrete issue . . . is the correctness of the 
Bankruptcy Court’s holding that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow the Debtors’ to deny the Senior 
Lenders the right to credit bid under the text of the relevant statutory provisions.”). 
 109. Pacific Lumber, 584 F.3d at 229.  
 110. Phila. Newspapers, 418 B.R. at 566–67. 
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section 1129(b)(2)(A) and its correlated definition in section 102(5).111  The 
court concluded that “satisfaction of any of the three subsections is 
sufficient to meet the fair and equitable test of § 1129(b)(2)(A).”112 
While the majority’s holding controlled, Judge Ambro’s lengthy 
dissent is certainly notable for its arguments against restricting credit 
bidding.  Citing Congress’ intent to protect secured creditors both in sales 
of their collateral free of liens and from undervaluations of their secured 
assets, Judge Ambro argued that section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) is “exclusively 
applicable to the proposed plan sale in this case, and with it comes a 
presumptive right to credit bid by the secured lenders.”113  Further, he noted 
that under this scheme, the debtors are free to argue that credit bidding 
should be restricted “for cause” under section 363(k) of the Code.114  
Subsequent arguments against restricting credit bidding have cited Judge 
Ambro’s dissent.115 
 
3.  River Road Hotel Partners, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank 
 
Anxious secured lenders received some reprieve when the Seventh 
Circuit in In re River Road Hotel Partners116 parted with the Third and 
Fifth Circuits and upheld secured creditors’ right to credit bid in connection 
with a sale of their collateral in a bankruptcy auction.  In River Road, the 
reorganization plan dictated that the debtors would sell substantially all of 
their assets, which were primarily hotel properties, and that no credit 
bidding would be permitted.117 
Soon after the plan was filed, the secured lenders filed an objection, 
arguing that the debtor’s plan could not satisfy section 1129(b)(2)(A)’s 
requirements because it “sought to sell encumbered assets free and clear of 
liens without allowing the lenders to bid their credit at the asset auctions, in 
violation of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii)’s requirement that secured 
creditors be given credit-bidding rights.”118  The debtors responded that in 
fact the plan was confirmable because it satisfied the “indubitable 
equivalent” standard of section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).119  However, the 
Bankruptcy Court ruled in favor of the secured creditors, holding that the 
 
 111. Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 319. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 338. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 651 F.3d 642, 653 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 116. Id. at 643. 
 117. Id. at 645. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
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debtors’ plan could not be confirmed under section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).120  
The debtors filed notices of appeal and both their appeals were certified 
directly to the Seventh Circuit.121 
On appeal, the debtors unwaveringly focused on the plain language of 
section 1129(b)(2)(A).  They argued that this language does not give courts 
discretion; instead, they are compelled to approve any cramdown plan that 
satisfies section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii)’s “indubitable equivalent” 
requirement.122  Further, they contend that the statute’s language 
“unambiguously indicates that a plan that provides a secured creditor with 
the proceeds from the sale of an asset at an auction that does not permit 
credit bidding satisfies the indubitable equivalence requirement.”123 
Unsympathetic to the debtors’ pleas, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the 
decision of the bankruptcy court, holding that “the Code requires that 
cramdown plans that contemplate selling encumbered assets free and clear 
of liens at an auction satisfy the requirements set forth in Subsection (ii) of 
the statute.”124  The court reasoned that canons of statutory construction 
dictate that it should interpret section 1129(b)(2)(A) in a way to give 
meaning to every part of the statute.125  On that logic, permitting a plan of 
reorganization to sell encumbered assets as described in section 
1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) without meeting the requirements of that subsection 
would make subsection (ii) superfluous.  The court reasoned that the much 
more plausible interpretation of section 1129(b)(2)(A) “would read each 
subsection as stating the requirements for a particular type of sale” with 
each subsection “conclusively governing” the event it regulates.126 
In taking up the debtors’ second argument, the Seventh Circuit 
rejected the idea that a plan providing the secured creditors with the 
proceeds of a sale of their collateral but not permitting them to credit bid 
automatically fulfills the “indubitable equivalence” standard.127  The court 
indicated that auctions restricting credit bidding run the risk of 
undervaluation, which creates a further risk that “the winning bids in these 
auctions would not provide the Lenders with the current market value of 
the encumbered assets.”128  In this way, the Seventh Circuit departed from 
In re Pacific Lumber and In re Philadelphia Newspapers, in which the 
circuit courts did not address the issue of whether the proposed treatment of 
 
 120. River Rd. Hotel Partners, 651 F.3d at 645. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 649. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 653. 
 125. Id. at 651 (citing TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)). 
 126. Id. at 652.  
 127. River Rd. Hotel Partners, 651 F.3d at 650–51. 
 128. Id. at 651. 
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secured creditors under the reorganization plan would have satisfied the 
indubitable equivalence standard. 
The Seventh Circuit rounded out its reasoning by taking a holistic 
look at the Bankruptcy Code.  The court reasoned, “the Code has an 
expressed interest in insuring that secured creditors are properly 
compensated.”129  Further, the court took up Justice Ambro’s reasoning in 
his In re Philadelphia Newspapers dissent, concluding that the Code does 
not contain any provisions that authorize a public auction where credit 
bidding is banned as a “legitimate way to dispose of encumbered assets.”130  
Under the debtors’ plan, secured creditors would not be provided the same 
types of protections enjoyed under other parts of the Code.  Thus, the 
debtors’ interpretation of section 1129(b)(2)(A) is “less plausible than a 
construction of the statute that reads Subsection (ii), which offers the 
standard protections to creditors, as providing the only way for plans 
seeking to sell encumbered assets free and clear of liens to obtain ‘fair and 
equitable’ status.”131  The logical corollary is that section 1129(b)(2)(A) 
should instead be read to provide secured creditors with the standard 
protections found elsewhere in the Code.  The Seventh Circuit ultimately 
held that the Code requires that the debtors’ reorganization plan provide 
secured creditors the protections afforded under section 
1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).132 
 
4.  RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, et al. v. Amalgamated Bank 
 
On December 12, 2011, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
review In re River Road Hotel Partners and resolve the circuit split 
between the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits.  Ultimately, the Supreme 
Court unanimously held on narrow statutory grounds that under section 
1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, secured creditors may not be 
denied the right to credit bid at a sale of their collateral pursuant to a 
Chapter 11 plan.133  Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, concluded that a 
cramdown plan that endeavors to hold a sale of collateral free and clear of 
encumbrances must satisfy the requirements set forth in section 
1129(b)(2)(A)(ii), and cannot be confirmed if it only satisfies the 
“indubitable equivalent” standard of section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).134  
Consequentially, debtors seeking to provide secured creditors with the 
 
 129. River Rd. Hotel Partners, 651 F.3d at 653. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. (quoting Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 331 (Ambro, J., dissenting)). 
 132. Id. 
     133.  RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 132 S. Ct. at 2073.  
     134.  Id. at 2072. 
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“indubitable equivalent” of their secured claims must also allow secured 
creditors to credit bid in a sale of their collateral. 
The circuit court decisions in Pacific Lumber and Philadelphia 
Newspapers, which suggested that secured creditors may be barred from 
credit bidding in a sale of their collateral pursuant to a Chapter 11 plan, 
were the subject of much dispute among commentators.  Indeed, many 
bankruptcy lawyers and commentators advocated for the Seventh Circuit’s 
view as presented in River Road, under which a reorganization plan 
involving the sale of collateral cannot be confirmed unless secured 
creditors are afforded the right to credit bid in the asset sale.135 
The Court’s analysis of the Bankruptcy Code’s section 1129(b)(2)(A) 
focused predominantly on principles of statutory construction.  The Court 
turned to the canon of statutory construction that “the specific governs the 
general” to dismiss the debtors’ reading of section 1129(b)(2)(A) as 
“hyperliteral and contrary to common sense.”136  In the eyes of the Court, 
subsection (ii) was a specific provision setting forth the prerequisites for 
selling collateral free of liens, while subsection (iii) contained broadly 
constructed language that does not refer to a sale of collateral.137  Under the 
lens of this general/specific canon of statutory interpretation, the general 
language of subsection (iii) does not apply where the sale is specifically 
addressed by subsection (ii).138 
In response to the debtors’ principle textual argument that section 
1129(b)(2)(A) “unambiguously provides three distinct options for 
confirming a Chapter 11 plan over the objection of a secured creditor,”139 
the Court asserted that “[t]he question here, is not whether debtors must 
comply with more than one clause, but rather which one of the three they 
must satisfy.”140  The debtors went on to argue that “clause (ii) is no more 
specific than clause (iii), because the former provides a procedural 
protection to secured creditors (credit-bidding) while the latter provides a 
substantive protection (indubitable equivalence).”141  As a result, the 
debtors argue, subsection (ii) is not “a limiting subset” of subsection (iii), 
which the general/specific canon requires.142  The Court responded to this 
argument by stating that it knew of no authority supporting the idea that the 
 
 135. DONALD S. BERNSTEIN ET AL., Credit Bidding in Chapter 11 after RadLAX,  in LAWRENCE P. 
KING AND CHARLES SELIGSON WORKSHOP ON BANKRUPTCY AND BUSINESS REORGANIZATION 2012, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2243669. 
 136. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 132 S. Ct. at 2068. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Brief for Petitioners at 15, RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 132 S. Ct. at 2065 (No. 11-166). 
 140. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 132 S. Ct. at 2072. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
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canon “is confined to situations in which the entirety of the specific 
provision is a ‘subset’ of the general one.”143 
In any case, the Court concluded that subsection (ii) is entirely a 
subset of subsection (iii).  Subsection (iii) applies to all cramdown plans, 
which includes all situations that the narrower subsection (ii) applies.144  
The Court observed that the scope, not the “nature of the provisions’ 
prescriptions,” is consequential when applying the general/specific 
canon.145 
Bearing in mind that its narrow statutory interpretation may not 
always be absolute, the Court pointed out that “the general/specific canon 
is not an absolute rule, but is merely a strong indication of statutory 
meaning that can be overcome by textual indications that point in the other 
direction.”146  It followed this tempering by noting that the present debtors 
“point to no such indication here.”147  The Court provided an example of 
this situation, which is a “statutory scheme in which the specific provision 
embraced within a general one is not superfluous, because it creates a so-
called safe harbor.” The Court rejected the debtors’ assertion that this was 
the case here; that “clause (iii) (‘indubitable equivalent’) being the general 
rule, and clauses (i) and (ii) setting forth procedures that will always, ipso 
facto, establish an “indubitable equivalent,” with no need for judicial 
evaluation.”148 
 
B.  EXPANDING THE SECTION 363(K) “FOR CAUSE” EXCEPTION 
 
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s momentous RadLAX decision, 
secured lenders are well advised to be mindful of section 363(k)’s power to 
restrict credit bidding.149  Traditionally, courts have rarely utilized the “for 
cause” exception borne out in section 363(k), generally only invoking it 
when there was a bona fide dispute over the extent or validity of a secured 
claim150 or some sort of misconduct by a creditor.151  Since RadLAX, 
however, bankruptcy courts have shown more willingness to resort to 
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section 363(k) to constrain credit bidding.152  In In re Fisker Automotive 
Holdings, Inc.153 and In re Free Lance-Star Publishing Company,154 two 
different bankruptcy courts suggested that merely furthering bankruptcy 
goals, such as enhancing the competition of an auction, could amount to a 
“cause” sufficient to restrict credit bidding. 
 
1.  In re Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc. 
 
In In re Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., Judge Kevin Gross of the 
prominent United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware 
provided some guidance as to the meaning of “for cause” in the context of 
section 363(k).  Fisker Automotive (“Fisker”) was founded in 2007.  Its 
primary business was the design and production of hybrid electric cars.155  
Three years later, Fisker received a loan from the United States Department 
of Energy to assist it in development and production of its products.156  
Fisker faced challenges that prevented it from operating as planned 
including safety recalls, loss of substantial inventory in Hurricane Sandy, 
and the loss of their Department of Energy lending facility.157 
On October 11, 2013, Hybrid Tech Holdings, LLC (“Hybrid”) 
purchased Fisker’s outstanding loan facility debt due to the Department of 
Energy.158  Although this debt totaled $168.5 million, Hybrid purchased it 
at the auction for $25 million, which equates to roughly fifteen cents on the 
dollar.159  Fisker eventually filed for Chapter 11 relief and originally 
attempted to sell its assets to Hybrid through an asset purchase agreement 
under which Hybrid would acquire “substantially all of the assets of 
Debtors for consideration which includes $75 million in the form of a 
credit bid” of the debt purchased from the Department of Energy.160 
The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors preferred an auction 
to a private sale and thus opposed Fisker’s yet-to-be consummated deal 
with Hybrid.161  Specifically, the creditors endeavored to restrict Hybrid’s 
ability to credit bid the debt it purchased from the Department of Energy.162  
Instead, the creditors proposed an auction with Wanxiang America 
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Corporation (“Wanxiang”).163  Wanxiang was a particularly attractive 
buyer because it had recently purchased at an auction assets of bankrupt 
A123 Systems, LLC for almost $300 million.164  Included in these assets 
was the lithium ion battery, which was the primary component of Fisker’s 
hybrid electric cars.165  Thus, Wanxiang had skin in the game.  However, 
Wanxiang recognized the power of Hybrid’s credit bid and refused to 
participate in an auction unless Hybrid’s ability to credit bid was restricted 
to $25 million.166 
At a hearing on January 10, 2014, Fisker and its unsecured creditors 
announced to the court that they agreed to narrow the scope of the dispute.  
Both parties stipulated that (1) restricting Hybrid’s right to credit bid would 
likely generate an auction with a material chance of creating significant 
value for the estate in an amount greater than Hybrid’s present credit bid;167 
(2) if Hybrid’s credit bid is not regulated, there is no realistic chance of an 
auction;168 (3) restricting Hybrid’s ability to credit bid “would likely foster 
and facilitate a competitive bidding environment”;169 and, lastly, (4) the 
assets offered for sale include properly perfected collateral, assets not 
subject to properly perfected liens in Hybrid’s favor, and assets where there 
is “no dispute as to whether Hybrid has a properly perfected lien.”170 
The question for the court was first whether Hybrid is entitled to a 
credit bid and, if so, could the court limit Hybrid’s ability to credit bid.171  
It was clear that if the answer to the second question was no, there would 
be no auction and Hybrid would acquire Fisker’s assets at bargain prices, 
leaving little for the creditors.172  The court immediately acknowledged 
secured creditors’ longstanding right to credit bid, citing Bankruptcy Code 
section 363(k), RadLAX, and Philadelphia Newspapers.173  However, the 
court promptly noted that “[t]he law is equally clear . . . that the Court may 
‘for cause order otherwise.’”174 
In an initial effort to determine what “cause” means for purposes of 
restricting credit bidding, the court engaged the Third Circuit’s ruling in In 
re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC.175  In the referenced block of the Third 
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Circuit’s opinion, the court noted that “[i]n a variety of cases where a 
debtor seeks to sell assets pursuant to § 363(b), courts have denied secured 
lenders the right to bid their credit.”176  Subsequently, in a footnote, the 
Third Circuit did away with the creditors’ argument that the court’s ability 
to restrict credit bidding “for cause” is limited to situations in which a 
“secured creditor has engaged in inequitable conduct.”177  Rather, 
according to the court, “[a] court may deny a lender the right to credit bid 
in the interest of any policy advanced by the Code, such as to ensure the 
success of the reorganization or to foster a competitive bidding 
environment.”178 
The court’s first rub was with the debtors’ truncated timeline and 
uncompromising attitude.179  The debtors filed these cases on November 
22, 2013, which was three days before Thanksgiving.180  They then insisted 
that the sale motion and confirmation hearings occur no later than January 
3, 2014, two days after New Years Day.181  This timeline only provided 
parties twenty-four days to challenge the sale motion, and less time for the 
committee of unsecured creditors, which was not appointed until December 
5, 2013.182  When the court prompted the debtors and Hybrid for 
justifications for such a contracted timeline, neither presented a satisfactory 
reason.183  In the end, the court focused on the third parties harmed by the 
downfall of Fisker, concluding that “[i]t is the Court’s view that Hybrid’s 
rush to purchase and to persist in such effort is inconsistent with the notions 
of fairness in the bankruptcy process.”184 
Next, the bankruptcy court took up the credit bid’s tendency to chill 
bidding in the bankruptcy auction.  The court reasoned that according to the 
stipulations set forth by both parties, there would be no bidding whatsoever 
if the court did not restrict Hybrid’s ability to credit bid.185  The court 
recognized that Wanxiang was a highly attractive prospective buyer, 
already having purchased assets consisting of the primary component of 
Fisker’s electric cars.186  Stressing that the parties’ stipulations posited that 
there would be no bidding, rather than just chilled bidding, the court 
concluded that “the ‘for cause’ basis upon which the Court is limiting 
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Hybrid’s credit bid is that bidding will not only be chilled without the cap; 
bidding will be frozen.”187 
Further drawing on the parties’ stipulations, the court addressed the 
unsecured creditors’ argument that the amount of Hybrid’s secured claim is 
uncertain.  Hybrid cited In re Submicron Systems Corp.,188 arguing that 
case law in the Third Circuit entitled it to credit bid its entire claim.  
However, the bankruptcy court distinguished the present case from 
Submicron Systems by reasoning that in the present case, it is the validity of 
the lien that is in dispute, not the value of the lien.189  The court thus 
justified limiting Hybrid’s ability to credit bid a claim secured by a lien of 
an undetermined amount, concluding that no party knew what portion of 
Hybrid’s claim would eventually be recognized as a secured claim.190 
Based on the above reasoning, the court allowed Hybrid to credit bid.  
But, it limited the extent to which Hybrid could do so to the $25 million it 
paid for the distressed debt.  Of note, the court did not explain why it 
selected the $25 million figure as the amount of the restriction.  Hybrid 
immediately sought emergency leave to appeal to both the district court and 
directly to the Third Circuit.  The district court denied both requests.191 
After the Bankruptcy Court limited Hybrid’s ability to credit bid, a 
competitive auction between Wanxiang and Hybrid ensued.  In the end, 
Wanxiang was awarded the assets for a bid of $149.2 million.192  Here, the 
ultimate sale price far exceeded the amount the estate would have received 
had the court not restricted Hybrid’s ability to credit bid. 
Fisker provides initial clarity as to what can constitute “cause” under 
section 363(k) of the Bankruptcy Code.  Although many distressed debt 
investors are squirming nervously in their seats, Fisker far from set the 
standard of how courts will interpret and employ section 363(k).  The chief 
takeaway in this regard is that although the court limited Hybrid’s ability to 
credit bid, it is unclear why the court selected $25 million, which was the 
price Hybrid paid for the distressed debt, as the appropriate ceiling.  It is 
possible that the court derived the $25 million figure from the parties’ 
stipulations, meaning it is unrelated to the purchase price of the debt.  
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However, more likely is that the court sought to protect the interests of the 
unsecured creditors and capping credit bidding at the purchase price was 
comfortably justifiable on these grounds. 
Regardless of why it chose the $25 million cap, the court’s focus was 
squarely on whether it could restrict secured creditors’ ability to credit bid.  
Judge Gross clearly answered that query in the affirmative.  Given the 
significant role that credit bidding plays in distressed acquisitions, 
distressed debt purchasers are wise to study how subsequent courts 
interpret and apply Fisker. 
 
2.  In re Free Lance-Star Publishing Company 
 
A few months after Fisker was decided, a second court followed suit 
in In re Free Lance-Star Publishing Company.193  The court largely 
adopted Fisker’s reasoning in limiting the secured creditor’s ability to 
credit bid.194  Here, Free Lance-Star Publishing Company entered Chapter 
11 intending to sell substantially all of its assets in a section 363 sale.195  
The debtor urged the court to limit the rights of its secured creditor, DSP 
Acquisition, to credit bid.196  It asserted that cause existed under section 
363(k) for three reasons.197  First, DSP did not have a lien on all of the 
debtors’ property being sold.198  Second, the debtors allege that DSP 
engaged in “inequitable conduct that has damped interest in the auction and 
depressed the potential sales price the Debtors’ otherwise might have 
realized from the sale of the business.”199  Lastly, the debtors asserted that 
restricting DSP’s ability to credit bid would foster a competitive bidding 
process by encouraging potential buyers to participate.200 
Free Lance-Star’s first two reasons are consistent with historic 
standards under which courts have limited secured creditors’ rights to 
credit bid.  However, with their third reason, that limiting the ability to 
credit bid would foster a competitive bidding process, the debtors adopted 
Fisker’s expansion of what constitutes “cause” for purposes of section 
363(k). 
In the end, the Bankruptcy Court limited DSP’s ability to credit bid.  It 
justified this restriction on a finding of a “perfect storm, requiring the 
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curtailment of DSP’s credit bidding rights.”201  The contributors to this 
perfect storm included “(i) DSP’s less than fully-secured lien status; (ii) 
DSP’s overly zealous loan-to-own strategy; and (iii) the negative impact of 
DSP’s misconduct.”202  Addressing DSP’s misconduct, the court cited the 
pressure DSP exerted over the debtor to cultivate a “speedy bankruptcy 
filing,” DSP’s strong objection to the debtor’s hiring of a financial 
consultant, insistence that the marketing materials “contain on the front 
page, in bold font, a statement that DSP had a right to a $39 million credit 
bid,” and that DSP had unilaterally recorded financing statements in an 
attempt to perfect a security interest in some of the debtors’ assets, which 
DSP did not have a lien on.203 
Although DSP engaged in inequitable conduct, the court did not 
extinguish the entirety of its right to credit bid.204  Rather, the court 
determined that “in order to foster a robust and competitive bidding 
environment,” sufficient cause existed to limit DSP’s credit bid to a total of 
$13.9 million.205  Hybrid filed an emergency motion seeking leave to 
appeal the ruling, which the Delaware’s District Court denied.206 
Like Fisker, it is not clear how Judge Huennekens arrived at that 
figure.  It is clear that he relied on Suzanne Roski, the debtors’ expert 
witness from its financial consultant who testified regarding the proposed 
bidding procedures and auction process.207  The court noted that “[t]he 
methodology Roski employed eliminated the unencumbered assets of the 
Debtors from the potential credit bid and applied a market analysis to 
develop an appropriate cap for a credit bid that would foster a competitive 
auction process.”208  Ultimately, DSP submitted the winning bid in the 
auction, in which it paid a total of about $30 million — $16.3 million in 
cash and a credit bid of $14 million.209 
 
3.  In re RML Development, Inc. 
 
Soon after Free Lance-Star, the United States Bankruptcy Court for 
the Western District of Tennessee handed down a decision that 
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commentators argue cuts against the grain of Fisker and Free Lance-Star.  
After careful study, however, these arguments appear misguided. 
In In re RML Development, Inc.,210 the debtor sought to sell two 
residential apartment complexes outside the ordinary course of business 
under section 363.  Subsequently, one of the creditors, SPCP Group III CNI 
1, LLC (“Silverpoint”) asserted that it held a valid first mortgage interest in 
both apartment complexes that the debtor sought to sell.211  It thus filed a 
motion seeking permission to credit bid the full amount of its secured claim 
at the bankruptcy auction.212  Silverpoint’s senior liens secured its 
obligations in the amount of approximately $2.5 million.213 
Unlike Fisker and Free Lance-Star, there were no allegations of 
inequitable conduct on the part of the secured creditors.  Rather, the debtor 
admitted that Silverpoint’s claim totaled approximately $2.3 million and 
only raised objections regarding the last $200,000.214  Ultimately, the court 
permitted Silverpoint to credit bid up to the undisputed value of its claim 
but required any bid over the $2.3 million figure to be bid in cash to be held 
in escrow until RML’s objection to Silverpoint’s claim was resolved.215  
The court noted that it should only restrict secured creditors’ ability to 
credit bid “when equitable concerns give it cause.”216  It went on to 
conclude, “such a modification or denial of credit bid rights should be the 
extraordinary exception and not the norm.”217  This clearly worded 
statement appears to suggest that “cause” under section 363(k) should be 
narrowly construed, thus limiting judicial authority to restrict credit bids 
and cutting against Fisker and Free Lance-Star.  However, after further 
analysis, this is not the case. 
Consider that in RML there were no allegations of inequitable conduct 
as there were in Fisker and Free Lance-Star.  So, giving context to the 
RML court’s statement that restricting credit bidding should be the 
extraordinary exception rather than the norm, it is conceivable that this 
statement was only intended to apply in similar situations where no 
inequitable conduct was present.  Viewed in this light, the statement was 
intended as a guidepost for cases such as RML where no inequitable 
conduct by a secured creditor was at issue. 
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Even more telling is the fact that despite concluding that restricting 
credit bids should be the extraordinary exception, the court did restrict 
Silverpoint’s credit bidding rights to the value of its undisputed claim.218  
Given its statement requiring an “extraordinary exception,” it is surprising 
that the court appeared to base its limitation on the finding of a “bona fide 
dispute” over whether the last $200,000 of Silverpoint’s claim is proper.219  
For a court so favoring judicial restraint in this regard, Judge David 
Kennedy implicitly set a low bar for limiting Silverpoint’s credit bid absent 
inequitable conduct. 
Yet, in a footnote the court pointed out, “where a creditor holds an 
uncontested secured claim, it should ordinarily be permitted to bid . . . 
regardless of its intrinsic impact on other bidding.”220  The court is clear 
that “mere ‘chilling’ of third party bids” will not suffice as cause to limit 
credit bidding rights.221  This point is potentially in conflict with the Fisker 
and Free Lance-Star courts’ opinions, in which chilling of the bidding was 
adjudged to have inhibited a competitive bidding process and thus 
contributed to “cause” to limit credit bidding. 
Thus, the extraordinary exception language used by the RML court 
cuts slightly against prior decisions in some respects, but does not go as far 
as it initially seems to.  In similar cases where no inequitable conduct on 
the part of secured creditors is alleged, RML seems to have set a low bar for 
restricting secured creditors’ right to credit bid in an auction. 
 
4.  In re Charles Street African Methodist Episcopal Church 
 
Most recently, in In re Charles Street African Methodist Episcopal 
Church,222 a bankruptcy court denied in part a debtor’s motion to limit 
credit bidding.  In Charles Street, Charles Street African Methodist 
Episcopal Church (“CSAME”) owned two contiguous parcels of real 
property.223  CSAME moved to sell these parcels free and clear of liens to 
its stalking horse bidder, Action for Boston Community Development, Inc. 
(“ABCD”), or to the highest bidder at an auction.224 
Pursuant to the plan, CSAME was obligated to pay ABCD a $50,000 
break-up fee if ABCD was not ultimately the highest bidder.225  Two other 
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parties, Horizons for Homeless Children, Inc. and OneUnited showed 
interest in bidding for the assets.226  However, the debtor’s motion also 
included a request to prohibit OneUnited from credit bidding for the assets 
or to at least require the non-stalking horse bidders to submit $210,000 in 
cash to pay ABCD’s break-up fee.227  CSAME also filed an objection to 
OneUnited’s claim.228  OneUnited’s claims were secured by CSAME’s real 
property.229 
Picking up on Judge Kennedy’s reasoning in RML, CSAME argued 
that its objection showed that OneUnited’s claim is subject to a “bona fide” 
dispute, which created sufficient cause to deny OneUnited’s right to credit 
bid under section 363(k).230  The bankruptcy court acknowledged that often 
“the existence of a bona fide dispute as to the secured claim is cause” to 
restrict credit bidding.231  However, under these facts, CSAME’s 
“counterclaims do not amount to cause to prohibit credit bidding.”232 
The court explained that it arrived at this conclusion primarily because 
CSAME’s objections do not challenge OneUnited’s underlying claims but 
instead “interpose counterclaims as the basis of a defense of setoff.”233 It 
went on to explain that “CSAME does not dispute the validity of the 
underlying loan agreements, the validity, perfection, or priority of 
OneUnited’s mortgages, the amounts claimed to be due, or anything 
intrinsic to either of OneUnited’s claims.”234 
The court also quickly disposed of an off-topic credit risk argument 
posed by CSAME.  CSAME’s argument, essentially, was that that if 
OneUnited was permitted to credit bid freely, then the claim that would 
satisfy CSAME’s counterclaim would already have, at least in part, been 
used up.235  This effectively rendered any judgment that CSAME may 
obtain on its counterclaims uncollectible.236  As a result, credit bidding 
created an unjust credit risk.237  The court seemed to see through this veiled 
attempt at securing prepayment.  Reasoning that CSAME had bad 
intentions in making this credit risk argument, the court concluded that 
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CSAME had attempted to use “a denial of credit bidding as, in essence, a 
form of prejudgment security.”238 
Next, the court took up CSAME’s alternative request for narrowed 
credit bidding rights.  In other words, CSAME requested that any bid not 
from the stalking-horse ABCD include a mandatory cash sum of $210,000 
to pay for the break-up fee due to ABCD.239  As OneUnited did not oppose 
this request, the court agreed that the “need to fund the break-up fee [was] 
cause to limit the right to credit bid.”240  However, the court saw no need to 
exceed the protection beyond the $50,000 break-up fee.  So, the court 
limited OneUnited’s right to credit bid only to the extent that in order to 
participate in the auction, it must include $50,000 cash in its bid.241 
It is unclear what role Charles Street plays in the ongoing chain of 
credit bidding case law.  CSAME expressly disavowed any reliance on 
theories used to limit credit bidding in Fisker including bid chilling and 
inequitable conduct by a secured creditor.242  Although the Charles Street 
court had “no occasion to address Fisker’s rationale,” this case stands to 
further define the boundaries of cause under section 363(k), specifically 
that courts will dismiss frivolous attempts by debtors to establish cause.243 
 
V.  HAVE COURTS SET A NEW STANDARD FOR WHAT 
CONSTITUTES SUFFICIENT CAUSE? 
 
The natural question, and the one which this Note aims to address, is 
whether courts have set a new standard for what constitutes cause sufficient 
to limit secured creditors’ right to credit bid under section 363(k) of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  A sufficient answer to this question may only be 
obtained through thorough analysis of the relevant case law after 
RadLAX.244  In sum, my evaluation is as follows: section 363(k) of the 
Code does not set parameters on what constitutes “cause” to limit the right 
to credit bid.  Legal scholars have made convincing arguments that Chapter 
11 has become obsolescent in today’s legal climate.245  Gone are the days 
where secured creditors need such robust protection. 
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In today’s system, investors, namely hedge funds and private equity 
firms, purchase outstanding obligations of distressed firms at steep 
discounts with the intention of extracting substantial value in bankruptcy.  
Bankruptcy courts must balance the interests of debtors while protecting 
secured creditors’ from undervaluation of their collateral in a sale.  The 
RadLAX decision reduced the ability of bankruptcy courts to ensure these 
equitable results in the current system by confirming that secured creditors 
may not be denied the right to credit bid at a sale of their collateral pursuant 
to a Chapter 11 plan under section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy 
Code.246  The Court decided RadLAX on very narrow statutory grounds, not 
discussing at length the equities associated with the current system of credit 
bidding.  It is plausible to read this restrained opinion as conferring to 
bankruptcy judges the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether 
credit bidding is fair and equitable and, if so, to what degree it should be 
permitted in a given case. 
In an effort to ensure equity since RadLAX, bankruptcy courts in 
Fisker and its progeny have struggled to discern what constitutes “cause” 
under section 363(k) of the Code.  Whether section 363(k) will evolve into 
an oft-used mechanism to ensure equity is unclear.  What is clear is that 
ambiguity abounds and we are likely to soon see appellate review and 
potentially another Supreme Court review of credit bidding. 
 
A.  THE EFFECT OF FISKER AND FREE LANCE-STAR 
 
The facts of Fisker exemplify the current climate of distressed debt 
investors attempting to extract value in bankruptcy.  Hybrid Tech Holdings, 
LLC purchased Fisker’s outstanding loan facility debt due to the 
Department of Energy at roughly fifteen cents on the dollar.247  Sensing 
inequity and undue pressure from Hybrid, Judge Kevin Gross invoked 
section 363(k) to limit Hybrid’s credit bidding ability.248  The reasons he 
cited for such action expanded the conventional interpretation of section 
363(k).  For example, he cited the debtors’ truncated timeline and 
uncompromising attitude, the complete freezing of bidding, and the 
uncertainty of Hybrid’s claim amount.  Fisker represented the first attempt 
of bankruptcy judges to combat inequity and so called “loan-to-own” 
strategies. 
The reasoning in Fisker gained momentum when the court in Free 
Lance-Star also invoked section 363(k) to limit the secured creditor’s right 
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to credit bid.249  The Free Lance-Star court relied heavily on the concepts 
originated in Fisker, even citing Fisker for the proposition that credit 
bidding can be restricted in order to promote a competitive bidding 
environment.250  Further, the court discussed at length what it considered 
“inequitable” conduct by DSP, focusing on the negative impact of DSP’s 
actions on the credit bid mechanism.251  Of note, however, is that Judge 
Kevin Huennekens did not address whether other factors, such as a dispute 
over the validity of the claim, were sufficient cause to limit credit 
bidding.252 
In both Fisker and Free Lance-Star, the secured creditors pursued 
loan-to-own strategies and the courts found them to have engaged in 
“inequitable conduct.” In Fisker, this meant trying to rush a private sale 
and in Free Lance-Star, this meant trying to stretch its lien on the debtor’s 
assets in bad faith.  So, the question remains, how much weight does each 
factor carry? Should investors purchasing secured debt of distressed firms 
at discounted prices be concerned or will courts require more than just a 
loan-to-own strategy to find cause sufficient to limit credit bidding rights? 
Taken to its logical extreme, Fisker stands for the proposition that courts 
may restrict credit bidding rights even without the presence of inequitable 
conduct or a dispute as to the validity of a creditor’s lien or claim.  
Unfortunately, any answers set forth at this point in time are merely 
conjecture.  Either uniformity in bankruptcy courts’ decisions or appellate 
guidance is needed to settle the issue. 
Even with the lack of decisive resolution, there are important 
takeaways from both Fisker and Free Lance-Star.  First, and most notably, 
the holdings can be plausibly interpreted as bankruptcy courts’ reactions to 
what they saw as inequitable loan-to-own strategies by influential investors 
attempting to exert excessive control over debtors and extract substantial 
value from the firm.  With this in mind, investors who purchase secured 
claims in distressed firms are well advised to be especially sensitive to how 
the court perceives their role in the bankruptcy process.  Specifically, 
courts and committees of unsecured creditors will scrutinize investors’ 
influence on the debtor’s timeline and on the debtor’s ability to secure 
financial advisors to aid it in obtaining the highest price in an auction. 
Second, Fisker and Free Lance-Star will continue to be relied on by 
parties in bankruptcy proceedings seeking to limit credit bidding rights.  
This leverage may be tapered, however, by subsequent case law and by the 
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relatively sizable discretion that bankruptcy judges wield.  Those holding 
secured claims will be wise to holistically evaluate the judge’s perception 
of their position in light of Fisker and Free Lance-Star when negotiating 
with debtors.  With the apparent judicial hostility towards loan-to-own 
strategies, secured claimholders must adapt to the negative impact that 
surely will follow the uncertainty created by these cases. 
 
B.  THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RML AND CHARLES STREET 
 
RML and Charles Street add to the base built by Fisker and Free 
Lance-Star.  However, RML is distinguishable from both Fisker and Free 
Lance-Star.  In RML, there were no allegations or findings of inequitable 
conduct by secured creditors.  The RML court focused its analysis on this 
principal of inequity, noting that credit bidding rights should only be 
restricted “when equitable concerns give it cause” and that this event 
should be the “extraordinary exception and not the norm.”253  It eventually 
limited the contested portion of the claim, finding that a “bona fide” dispute 
existed as to the extent of the claim.254 
The RML decision potentially departs from Fisker and Free Lance-
Star regarding the weight of credit bidding’s “chilling” effect on auctions.  
The RML court plainly holds that “mere ‘chilling’ of third party bids” will 
not suffice as cause to limit credit bidding rights.255  In contrast, the Fisker 
and Free Lance-Star courts included bid chilling in their justification for 
limiting credit bidding.  However, of note, the courts did not limit credit 
bidding solely on the basis of bid chilling.  In this regard, RML does not 
directly conflict with Fisker and Free Lance-Star, but may indicate a 
departure from their required level of evidence. 
Unfortunately, the RML court left unclear whether its hostile attitude 
toward limiting credit bidding rights should apply only under similar 
situations or whether its logic was also intended to apply to situations in 
which there was inequitable conduct.  Regardless, the opinion is surely 
influential in cases that do not include allegations or findings of inequitable 
conduct. 
The Charles Street reasoning sets forth a more traditional, pre-Fisker 
case.  There, the court refused to limit credit bidding except for a pre-
determined break-up fee agreed to with the stalking horse bidder.  CSAME 
attempted to take up the RML court’s logic by arguing that its objection 
showed that the secured creditor’s claim is subject to a “bona fide” dispute, 
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which created sufficient cause to deny the secured creditor’s right to credit 
bid.256  In denying CSAME’s attempt to restrict the secured creditor’s 
credit bid, the court observed that “CSAME does not dispute the validity of 
the underlying loan agreements, the validity, perfection, or priority of 
OneUnited’s mortgages, the amounts claimed to be due, or anything 
intrinsic to either of OneUnited’s claims.”257  This suggests that the court 
saw through CSAME’s veiled attempt to stifle credit bidding and, 
upholding principles of equity, dismissed it as such. 
The court in Charles Street expressly noted that it was not addressing 
the “types of ‘cause’” at issue in Fisker.  Thus, Charles Street stands to 
support the proposition that although a dispute over the validity of a claim 
or lien may constitute cause, veiled attempts to utilize counterclaims that 
do not challenge the underlying claims as a defense to restrict credit 
bidding will be struck down. 
 
C.  SO, WHERE DO WE STAND? 
 
The question left open by Fisker and its progeny still is: How wide of 
an interpretation will courts use in interpreting cause as sufficient grounds 
to limit credit bidding? Under what circumstances will a court limit a 
secured creditor’s right to credit bid? For example, could a mere showing 
of a loan-to-own strategy that would depress the debtor’s ability to fetch 
the highest price at an auction be sufficient? 
No one has yet attempted to establish cause under section 363(k) by 
showing that the secured claimant acquired the debt as part of a strategy to 
acquire the firm or its assets.  This, however, is a logical extension of the 
case law.  As long as it is profitable, secured creditors will continue to 
make use of credit bidding as part of acquisition strategies.  As a result, 
bankruptcy courts will likely be asked to consider such contentions and set 
firmer parameters defining what constitutes cause to restrict credit bidding. 
If the judiciary continues to limit credit bidding for cause, purchasers 
of secured claims of distressed companies may lose much of their incentive 
for acquiring such debt.  This alteration of claim purchasers’ incentive 
structure will also impact secured creditors and debtors.  Increased risk of 
bankruptcy courts limiting credit bidding will drive down the price of 
distressed companies’ outstanding claims.  The extent to which secured 
creditors may encounter difficulty selling debt that they own in distressed 
companies is unclear.  Should secured creditors experience increased 
difficulty divesting their claims, debtors may gain leverage in negotiations 
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with secured creditors.  As a result, secured creditors may face additional 
pressure to negotiate with the debtor to restructure their debt.  These 
negative effects caused by judicial uncertainty shift the negotiating clout 
surrounding the bankruptcy process and must be carefully examined. 
There is no definitive indication that the judiciary intends to use 
section 363(k) to reduce secured creditors’ ability to acquire debtors’ assets 
at depressed prices or to influence the bankruptcy process by way of credit 
bidding.  Reduced secured creditor clout could increase values of 
bankruptcy estates, which the judiciary holds as a fundamental goal of 
bankruptcy law.  If the courts intend to find a solution to the issues 
surrounding credit bidding, they must resolve the uncertainty. 
There is no consensus manner to remedy this issue to be found in the 
dearth of academic literature surrounding credit bidding.258  However, what 
these writings do agree on is that Fisker and its progeny could have serious 
implications on future auctions and more generally on the market for 
secured claims of distressed companies.259 
Secured creditors seeking to avoid limitations of their ability to credit 
bid must be aware of the perception they now carry and the potentially 
associated tradeoffs.  The days of pressuring debtors into a hasty, 
conclusive sale and having unlimited credit bidding power may be over.  
Instead, secured creditors must be prepared for a world in which judges 
scrutinize interactions and encourage competitive auction processes 
conducted on lenient timetables as the dominant method of selling the 
assets of distressed firms in bankruptcy. 
 
D.  A PATH FORWARD 
 
In the vast majority of cases, courts should permit secured creditors to 
credit bid the full value of their secured claim.  However, in limited 
circumstances, courts may appropriately limit secured creditors’ right to 
credit bit for cause under section 363(k) to the creditors’ basis in the 
secured claim.  Such limited circumstances include special situations in 
which the bankruptcy court either reasonably seeks to avoid inequitable 
conduct by secured creditors or must act to prevent unreasonable bid 
chilling.  This proposal aims to strike a balance between secured creditors’ 
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right to protect the value of their claim and bankruptcy law’s goal of 
maximizing the value of debtors’ estates. 
In the limited circumstances where courts appropriately cap credit 
bidding, the secured creditors’ basis in his claim is an appropriate cap.  
Two primary assertions underpin this principle.  First, section 363 seeks to 
avoid the difficulties and inefficiencies involved in judicial valuation of 
collateral.  Instead, courts prefer deferring to a free market sale to value 
assets.260  Implicit in this notion is that a free market sale must be 
referenced in order to avoid conducting a judicial valuation of collateral.  In 
the context of a secured creditor planning a credit bid, the most recent sale 
prior to a bankruptcy auction is typically the acquisition of secured claims.  
The price paid for these secured claims is thus the best representation of 
value that courts have to reference. 
Second, capping the right to credit bid at secured creditors’ basis in 
the claim will, to a large extent, prevent bid chilling and inequitable 
conduct.  If outside market participants do not face a credit bid representing 
claims exceeding the value of the collateral, they are more likely to invest 
the time and money to conduct due diligence and potentially submit a bid.  
Further, capping credit bidding at secured creditors’ basis reduces the clout 
that secured creditors wield in negotiations.  If a debtor believes that an 
auction will yield a third party bid greater than the value of a secured 
creditor’s basis in his claim, it will be less likely to agree to inequitable 
arrangements with the secured creditor prior to the auction.  This 
mechanism allows debtors to avoid, for example, pressured sales to secured 
creditors on contracted timelines. 
When evaluating proposed credit bidding arrangements, courts’ focus 
should be on equity.  Thus, unusual circumstances where equity so 
demands are appropriate situations in which to limit credit bidding.  
Blanket prohibitions on secured creditors’ right to credit bid are improper.  
Rather, courts may find limiting credit bids to the claimholder’s basis to be 
a justifiable cap.  This cap both protects bankruptcy estates from improper 
bid chilling and inequitable conduct by secured creditors and assures 
secured creditors the right to credit bid a reasonable amount of their claims. 
To the extent that courts invoke section 363(k) to limit the right to 
credit bid in order to avoid undue influence, they must draw a boundary 
indicating a zone of permissible activities for secured creditors to operate 
within.  The legal field of lender liability provides guidance on this issue.  
In In re Radnor Holdings Corp.,261 the court concluded that the overarching 
inquiry in a recharacterization of debt to equity is the intent of the parties.  
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Although I disagree with this conclusion, the court correctly emphasized 
that no “mechanistic” approach would suffice and a “common sense 
evaluation of the facts and circumstances surrounding a transaction” must 
be applied.262  In the context of assessing undue influence by secured 
creditors, this evaluation includes consideration of the bargaining positions 
of each party, availability of outside options, control that the secured 
creditor maintains over the day-to-day operations of the debtor, the secured 
creditor’s control of the debtor’s board of directors, and the economic 
reality of the surrounding circumstances.  In limited circumstances, these 
factors may suggest that a cap on credit bidding is appropriate. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
With secured creditors hugely profiting from acquisition strategies 
utilizing credit bidding, they will expectedly continue to push the 
boundaries of the law.  As a result, bankruptcy courts will likely be 
increasingly called upon to consider objections to bidding procedures.  
While the traditional method of challenging the validity or priority of the 
underlying claim will persist, use of the “for cause” exception embodied in 
section 363(k) of the Code will continue to garner increased attention.  The 
arguments for what constitutes “cause” will expand and courts will likely 
be compelled to set parameters.  At this time, the extent to which courts 
will limit credit biding “for cause” remains unclear.  Whether or not courts 
continue to expand the “for cause” exception in the long term, the current 
climate of uncertainty will continue to produce negative effects in the 
market for secured claims of distressed companies.  As a result of the 
negative externalities associated with such unfettered uncertainty, we are 
likely to see forthcoming appellate guidance and potentially Supreme Court 













 262. Radnor Holdings, 353 B.R.at 840. 
